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Abstract 
Purpose: The purpose of the study was to examine the 
relationship between corporate governance practices 
and modified audit opinion in the commercial and 
manufacturing sector of state owned enterprises in 
Kenya.  
Design/Methodology/Approach: The study collected 
data from 25 companies in the commercial and 
manufacturing sector covering the period 2013 to 2016. 
Logistic regression technique was adopted to analyze the 
variables.  
Findings:  The study findings established negative and 
significant effect of both board size and board 
independence on modified audit opinion. This results 
suggest board size and percentage of independent 
directors significantly influenced the likelihood of state 
owned enterprises receiving modified opinion. Results 
on the effect of control variables; leverage and return on 
assets were statistically insignificant.  
Originality/Value: This study contributes to both 
theoretical literature and empirical evidence in the 
corporate governance in public sector context. 
 
DOI: 10.32602/jafas.2020.030 
Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing Studies 6/4 (2020): 96-110 
 
 97 
1.0 Introduction 
The subject of transparency accountability is a topic of great interest in both private and 
public sectors. Different countries have attempted to improve corporate governance in order 
to advance accountability and transparency. Sarbanes Oxley act (2002) put the responsibility 
of quality in financial reporting in United states on the board of directors. The world Bank 
(2014) tool kit for corporate governance argues that external audit can ensure transparency 
and accountability in state owned enterprises. In Kenya Mwongozo (2015) code of corporate 
governance for state corporation similarly puts the responsibility of accountability and 
transparency in the board of directors. Mwongozo (2015) outlines how boards of state 
corporation should be structured to ensure transparency and accountability in state owned 
enterprise in Kenya. A world Bank report (2014) indicated that SOEs greatly contributed to 
the economy of many countries including provision of critical services. Boards of directors 
are responsible for monitoring and supervision of information presented by management. 
Consequently, if done correctly it could lead to improved quality of financial reporting. This 
means that well managed enterprises are less likely to receive modified audit opinion from 
independent auditors. Tian and Xin (2017) observed that audit opinion was important 
because it offered a reflection, whether financial statements presented by management 
offered a true and fair view. This information would be beneficial to diverse stakeholders. 
Farinha and Viana (2009) observed that modification of audit reports was a sign of poor 
quality in financial reporting. Hsiao, Lin and Hsu (2010) observed that various forms of 
modification include; qualified opinion, adverse opinion and disclaimer opinion. Unmodified 
audit opinion can bring trust and confidence in financial reporting by the agent. This is likely 
to convince investors and lenders to provide more finances (Green & Singleton, 2009). In the 
public sector the public who pay taxes and investors may want to know through audit 
reports how the state owned enterprises use their taxes and investments.  
Empirical evidence on the effect of corporate governance practices on modified opinion was 
mixed and inconclusive. Saaydah (2019) established positive association between board size 
and modified opinion, however the results on effect of independent directors was 
insignificant. In contrast Farinha and Viana (2009) established negative effect of board 
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independence on modified opinion while the results for board size were insignificant. Ishak 
and Yusof (2015) established board independence had a negative association, with modified 
audit opinion in Malasyia. The contrasting findings on the determinants of audit modification 
means that the subject remains unsetled hence the need for furthur research. This study 
aims to establish the effect of corporate governance variables of board size and percentage of 
independent directors on modified audit opinion. 
1.1 State owned enterprises in Kenya 
According public financial management act 2012 state owned enterprises (SOEs) in Kenya 
are entities where the government of Kenya has a controlling state or a case whereby there is 
specific legislation classifying the entity as state owned entity. The control and direction of 
SOEs in Kenya is guided by Mwongozo (2015) code of governance of state corporations. In 
terms of board independence Mwongozo code guidelines requires that at least thirty 
percentage of board members be non-executive board members. In terms of board size 
Mwongozo guidelines recommends a board size of 7-9 members to govern these entities 
effectively. Article 229 (6) of constitution of Kenya 2010 puts the office of the auditor –
general of Kenya as the supreme audit institution(SAI) responsible for checking for 
accountability in SOEs in Kenya.  
1.3 Study Objectives 
I. To establish the effect of board size on modified audit opinion in commercial and 
manufacturing state owned entities in Kenya. 
II. To establish the effect of board independence on modified audit opinion in 
commercial and manufacturing in state owned entities in Kenya 
III. To establish the effect of leverage as a controlling variable   on relationship between 
corporate governance and modified audit opinion.  
IV. To establish the effect of return on assets as a controlling variable on relationship 
between corporate governance and modified audit opinion. 
2.  Literature Review 
2.1 Theoretical Foundation 
Hay and Cordery (2017) reviewed history of public sector audit and observed that agency 
theory was the dominant theory guiding of audit and corporate governance in both public 
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and private sectors. Board of directors are responsible for monitoring and supervising 
management of SOEs. If done effectively it will result to quality financial reporting that will 
attract unmodified audit reports from independent auditors. 
The agency theory as argued by Ross (1973); Jensen and Meckling (1976) holds that as result 
of separation of ownership and control managers are likely to make decisions that maximize 
their own utility at expense of owners. This arises due to information asymmetry between 
management and the owners. Agency theory proponents argue that through corporate 
governance mechanisms including independent audit and board structure the agency costs 
can be reduced. Independent board, large boards with independent auditors will bring trust 
and confidence by reducing information asymmetry between management and the agent. If 
dove correctly this is likely to results to quality in financial reporting. Stream (1994) 
observed that the agency problem was more complex in the public sector when compared 
with private sector due multiple relationships. Between the citizens and Legislation, 
Legislations and executive and between the executive and CEOs of various entities. Wallace 
(1980) observed that even in the public sector auditing was valued because it helped reduce 
the agency costs. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) observed that board effectiveness in terms 
of monitoring was a function of board independence. 
 Stakeholder theory as argued by Freeman (1984) offers another perspective in corporate 
governance and audit opinion. The theory holds that through governance mechanisms 
including board of directors’ interest of diverse stakeholders would be protected.  Based on 
stakeholders’ theory perspective audit opinion will be of great interest to various 
stakeholders to ensure their interests are protected.  
2.2 Empirical review 
Saaydah (2019) examined the relationship between corporate governance and audit 
modification in Jordanian securities market. The study analyzed data from 104 firms using 
logistic regression. The study established significant positive relationship between board 
size and modified audit opinion. The study established insignificant relationship between 
board independence and modified audit opinion.  
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Jouri (2016) examined the relationship between  auditors opinion and corporate governance  
in Tehran securities market. Data was collected  from 90 listed companies  covering the 
period 2001 to 2008. The  study findings established significant relationship between weak 
corporate governance and qualified opinion. However, no significant relationship was 
establsihed between strong govermance and unqualified audit opinion. 
Ishak  and Yusof  (2015) in  a study in Malasyia examined the impact of board independence 
in modification of audit reports.The study sampled 300 finacial companies covering the 
period 2004 to 2009.Regression analysis was used to examine the relationship between the 
variables.The study established that board independence was negatively related to modified 
audit opinion. In addition the study established that firm characteristcis variables inluding 
leverage influenced audit modification. Other board characteristics variables including board 
size and return on assets size were statistically insignificant. 
Tsipouridou and Spathis ( 2014) examined the effect of  earnings management on audit 
opinion in Athen stock exchange. The study conluded that earnings mangement did not 
influence the  modification of audit opinion in Greece. However financial characteristics 
inluding firm size and profitability significantly influnced modification of audit opinion. 
 Kangarlouei, Jam and Motavassel (2013) examined the effect of sound corporate governance 
practices on the quality of financial reporting in Tehran securities market. The study 
collected and anaysed data covering the period 2013 to 2012. The study estalished that firms 
with weak corporate governance practices were more likey to receive modified audit opinion 
in Tehran.  
Habib(2013) using meta-analysis  technique examined  propensity  for modified audit 
opinion.  72 articles were examined from the 1982- 2011. The study established that firm 
specific characteristics influnced the propensity to issue modified audit opinion. Firms that 
received modified opinion shared same characteristics in terms profitability, leverage, Size 
and profitability. 
 Hsiao, Lin and Hsu (2010)  in a study in Taiwan examined  finacially distressed firm, 
earnings management corporate governance and audit opinion. The study collected data 
covering the period 1997 to 2007.The study used regression analysis to draw conlusions.The 
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study findings  established that distressed companies were more likely to manipulate finacial 
information resulting to modified audit opinion.Futhur, entities dominated by executive 
directors had higher ratio of qualified opinion. 
Farinha  and Viana  (2009) in  a study in Portoguece securities market examined modified 
opinion and board structure. Data was analysed using logistic regression covering the period 
2002 to 2003. The study established that board independence was negatively related with 
modified opinion.This means that companies with independent directors were less likeliy to 
receive modified audit opinion.The result for board size were statisticaly insignificant. In 
addition the study established that other control variables including growth, performance 
and financial health contributed to the probablity of firm receiveing modified opinion. 
Caramanis and Spathis (2006) examined determinants of audit qualification in Athens 
securities market. The study tested and analyzed data from 185 companies using logistic 
regression. The study established that audit qualifications was significantly related to 
financial metrics including profit margin, as ratio to currents and total assets. 
Ballesta and Garcıa-Meca (2005) in a study using spanish listed companies examined audit 
qualifications and corporate govenance. Data was collected for  the period 1999 to 2002 and 
analysed using regression analysis.The study established that higher ownership 
concentration resulted to effective corporate governance leading to better supervision on 
management.This resulted to quality financial reporting thus reducing the chance of 
receiveing qualified opinion. Family ownership increased the chances of modification of 
audit opinion. 
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2.3 Conceptual Framework 
                                                                              Figure 1 
                                                                            Control Variable 
                                                                               
 
            Independent Variable                                                                                                                                Dependent Variable
 
 
 
 
Based on empirical and theoretical framework .The study conceptualized  relationship as 
depicted in Figure1. Sound corporate governance mechanisms could lead to quality financial 
reporting hence determining the type of audit opinion to be issued by the independent 
auditor. Leverage and return of assets were used as control variables. 
2.4 Study Hypothesis 
H1: Board size has a negative and significant effect   on modified opinion.  
H2 : Board independence  has negative and significant effect on modified opinion.  
H3: Leverage  as control variable has positive effect on  the relationship between corporate 
governance  modified audit opinion. 
H4 : Return on assets  as control variable has a negative effect on the relationship between 
corporate governance with modified audit opinion. 
Audit Opinion 
 Modified 
 Unmodified 
 
Corporate Governance 
 Board Size 
 Percentage of 
independent 
directors 
 Return on 
Assets 
 Leverage 
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3.0 Methodology  
3.1 Research Design  
This study employed correlational research design. Correlational research design uses 
statistics to describe and measure the degree of association among the study variables 
(Cresswell, 2014).  
3.2 Data collection 
The study collected data from 25 companies of the 33 enterprises in commercial and 
manufacturing sector as categorized by (SCAC,2020). The data was obtained from annual 
reports covering the period 2013 to 2016. Data on board size, and non – executive directors  
was obtained from  governance statements in the  annual reports. Data on the audit opinion 
was obtained from audit reports published by the auditor general of Kenya. Data on leverage 
and return on assets  ware calculated from financial data obtained from financial statements 
in the   annual reports. 
3.3 Operationalization of Study Variables 
Table 1: Operationalization of  study Variables 
Variable Measurement 
Audit Opinion Coded “0” = unmodified “1” = Modified Opinion 
Board Size  Total member of board members 
Board Independence 
Number of nun-executive directors as 
percentage to total number of directors 
Leverage Ratio of debt to equity 
Return on assets Ratio of net income to total assets 
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3.3 Model Specification 
To  measure the level of association among the study variables  the study adopted logistic 
regression. A logistic regression model is an extention  of generalised model. Logit models 
are flexible and  able to accommodate  categorical dependent variable (Francis, 2017). 
AO= α +β1BDsize +β2PerIND  +β3ROA+β4Leverage +ε------------------(1) 
AO = The audit opinion 
α =the intercept 
β = the coefficeint 
BDsize= The total number of board members 
PerIND= the percentage on non executive directors 
ROA= Return of total assets  
Leverage= is measured as ratio of debt to equity 
ε = is the error term 
4.0 Results and Discussion 
4.1 Frequency Distribution Audit Opinion 
Table 2: Distribution of Audit Opinion  
Audit Opinion Frequency %       Cumulative % 
Unmodified 32 32.0 
Modified 68 68.0 
Total 100 100.0 
 
Table 2 presents the distribution of audit opinion in commercial and manufacturing sector of 
state owned enterprises from 2013 to 2016. The results show that 32% of SOEs received 
unmodified audit opinion. While 68% of SOEs received modified audit opinions. This results 
indicates more SOEs received modified opinions compared to clean reports. This results 
suggest corporate governance challenges in majority of SOEs in Kenya.  
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4.2 Discriptive Statistics 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
BdSize 10O 10.08 1.988 4 16 
PerIND 100 .3400 .189 0 1 
Leverage 100 .29645 1.686 -11.127 6.692 
ROA 100 1.485 10.153                         -1.158 93.631 
 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the research variables. The results on the board 
size indicate mean board size of 10.08 with maximum of 16 with minimum of 4, Mwongozo 
(2015) code of corporate governance for state corporations 2015 recommends board size of 
7-9 members. Percentage of non-executive directors indicate a mean of 34% with a 
maximum of 100 with a standard deviation of 18.9%. Results Leverage indicates a mean of 
.29645with a maximum of 6.692. Return on assets as a measure of performance results 
indicate a mean of 1.485 minimum of -1.158 and maximum of 93.63.  
4.3 Pearson Correlations 
Table 4: Pearson Correlations 
 Audit 
Opinion 
Bdsze PerIND Leverage ROA 
Opinion 1     
Bdsze -0.2540    1    
PerIND -0.2277   -0.3951    1   
Leverage -0.0424    0.0217   -0.0886    1  
ROA   0.0404    0.0490    0.0725    0.0116    1 
  
Table 4 presents the Pearson correlation results. The results indicate negative correlation 
between corporate governance variables board size, percentage of independent directors 
and modified audit opinion. Further, the results indicate negative correlation between 
leverage as control variable and audit opinion. The results indicate positive correlation 
between modified opinion and return on assets. 
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4.3 Diagnostic Test 
4.3.1 Multicollinearity 
 Table 5: Collinearity Statistics 
                        Model 
 
Tolerance VIF 
1 Bsize .838 1.194 
PerIND .829 1.206 
Leverage .992 1.009 
ROA .987 1.013 
a. Dependent Variable: Opinion 
Table 5 presents collinearity statistics. Multicollinearity problem occurs when the 
explanatory variables are highly correlated. This creates a problem in the relationship 
between the response and explanatory that will be distorted leading to incorrect 
interpretation. Multi collinearity problem is tested using the variance inflation factor 
whereby VIF > 5 will mean highly correlated. The results reveal VIF values below < 5 
meaning the no multicollinearity problem (Mela & Kopalle , 2002). 
4.3.2 Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
Table 6: Omnibus Test Model Coefficients  
 Chi-square Df Sig. 
 
 22.238 4 .000 
Block 22.238 4 .000 
Model 22.238 4 .000 
 
Table 6 presents the omnibus tests of model coefficients results. The results of the model 
indicate model value Chi-square 22.238 statistically significant with p value < 0.05 meaning 
that current model is better than null model. 
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4.3.4 Model Accuracy Prediction Statistics 
 Table 7:Classification Table 
 Predicted 
 Unmodified Opinion Modified Opinion Percentage 
Unmodified Opinion 10 22 31.3 
Modified Opinion 7 61 89.7 
Overall Percentage   71.0 
Table 7 presents the classification results that shows the prediction accuracy of the model. 
The result indicates overall prediction accuracy of 71%. This proves that the model had high 
prediction success. 
4.4 Hypothesis Testing 
Table 8: Model Summary 
Number of obs 100 
LR chi2(3) 21.42 
Prob > chi2 0.0001 
Pseudo R2 0.1708 
Table 8 presents the model summary results the results Chi- square value of 21.42 with p 
value < 0.05 statistically significant. This suggest that the model is more accurate compared 
to null model. The table also indicate pseudo R of 17.08% indicating that changes audit 
opinion could be explained by changes in corporate governance variables. 
 Table 9: Logistic Regression Results 
 B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
 Bsize -.540 .153 12.408 1 .000 .583 
PerIND -5.757 1.657 12.063 1 .001 .003 
ROA .021 .027 .606 1 .436 1.021 
Leverage -.071 .140 .260 1 .610 .931 
Constant 8.335 2.008 17.233 1 .000 4169.283 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Bsize, PerIND, ROA, Leverage. 
Table 9 presents the logistic regression results. Board size indicates negative coefficient β -
0.540 Exp value β 0.583 that is statistically significant as p value < 0.05. This means negative 
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relationship between board size and modified audit opinion. The results suggest that a unit 
increase in board size lowered the odds of a firm receiving modified opinion by a factor of 
0.583. This finding is not in agreement with a study by Saaydah (2019) that established 
significant positive relationship between board size and modified audit opinion. Board 
independence results indicates negative coefficient β value -6.757 with Exp β 0.003 that is 
also statistically significant as the p value <0.05.  This means negative relationship between 
percentage non-executive directors and modified audit opinion. A unit increase in 
percentage of non –executive director lowered the odds of a firm receiving modified opinion 
by a factor of 0.003. This findings agreement with previous studies by (Ishak & Yusof ,2015; 
Farinha & Viana, 2009). The results for ROA as control variable shows positive relationship β 
0.021 that is statistically insignificant as P value >0.05.  This means that ROA as measure of 
firm performance did not influence odds of receiving modification of audit opinion. The 
results for Leverage shows β -0.071 Exp 0.931 also statistically insignificant p value > 0.05. 
This means that leverage as control variable did not significantly influence the odds of SOEs 
Kenya receiving modified audit opinion. These findings are not in agreement with (Habib, 
2013; Tsipouridou & Spathis, 2014) that related firm characteristics variables with 
modification of audit opinion. 
Conclusions  
The study examined the relationship between board structure and modified opinion in 
commercial and manufacturing state owned entities in Kenya. The results reveal board size 
has negative and significant association with modified audit opinion. This finding suggest 
that the size of the board will influence the likelihood of a firm receiving modified opinion. 
Consequently, firms with large boards were less likely to receive modified opinion due 
monitoring effectiveness of large boards. Similarly, the results indicate negative and 
significant relationship between board independence and audit opinion. This finding suggest 
that enterprises with more independent directors were less likely to receive modified audit 
opinion. The negative association between both board size, board independence and 
modified opinion is in agreement with Agency theoretical perspective on importance 
corporate governance practices. The results effect of controlling variables; leverage and 
return of assets was statistically insignificant. This means that both leverage and return on 
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assets as control variables did not influence the odds of state owned enterprises receiving 
modified audit opinion in Kenya.  
The findings in this study will prove useful to those charged with corporate governance in 
SOEs in Kenya. There is evidence that board size and independent directors significantly 
influenced the likelihood of a firm receiving modified audit opinion. This study significantly 
contributed to development of literature on effectiveness corporate governance practices in 
the public sector in Kenya. In addition, the study contributed to methodology on 
operationalization and testing variables in the public sector context.  
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